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From Fact-checking to Value-checking: Normative
Reasoning in the New Public Sphere
DAVID YARROW
Abstract
This article suggests that fact checking is a useful but incomplete framework for delivering an
epistemically healthy public sphere. Through a brief history of the fact/value distinction, it is
argued that there is no secure justification for limiting interventions aimed at improving the
emergent digital public sphere only to factual claims. On this basis, the heuristic principle of
‘value checking’ is outlined, as a complement to fact checking in the epistemic regulation of dem-
ocratic discourse. Value checking would accept that more sophisticated and deliberative com-
munication is a vital requirement for a well-functioning public sphere, and that this can be
promoted through new forms of epistemic regulation. However, it would reject the notion that
fact checking is sufficient to achieve this, suggesting that the promotion of healthy political com-
munication should also extend to value-based reasoning. The principle of value checking could
be added to the fact-checking paradigm as a means of further enriching the public sphere in the
‘post-truth’ age.
Keywords: fact checking, digital democracy, post truth, public sphere, social media, expertise
Introduction
THE DEBATE OVER political debate is in a
muddle. Across the political spectrum we see
acute concern over the declining quality of
political discourse and its implications for the
epistemic health of democracy.1 There is no
consensus over the legitimate scope or nature
of regulatory interventions that might
improve this situation, or even who the proper
actors to perform these new regulatory func-
tions might be.2 The ad hoc nature of the per-
manent suspension of Donald Trump from
Twitter in January 2021 has compounded this
sense of confusion over the principles that
should regulate the digital public sphere, and
the extent of their application. There is, how-
ever, broad agreement on a key objective of
these new epistemic interventions: they
should seek to establish ‘the facts’.
As explored in a recent special issue of The
Political Quarterly, the fact-checking paradigm
has emerged as a dominant response in media
ethics and regulation to fears over fake news,
the dissemination of misinformation and the
broader rise of post-truth politics.3 Before his
permanent suspension, Twitter dramatically
employed fact-checking principles during the
2020 US presidential election campaign to flag
Trump’s claims about electoral fraud and to
direct users to official sources of information.
Private third party fact-checking organisations
have been championed by Facebook in
response to demands by regulators and legis-
lators that they take responsibility for political
content circulated on their platforms. The
growing use of fact-checking firms to flag
and analyse content was highlighted by Mark
Zuckerberg in his 2019 appearances before
Congress as evidence that tougher external
1J. A. Tucker, et al., ‘From liberation to turmoil:
social media and democracy’, Journal of Democracy,
vol. 28, no. 4, 2017, pp. 46–59.
2N. Marres, ‘Why we can’t have our facts back’,
Engaging Science, Technology, and Society, vol. 4,
2018, pp. 423–443.
3J. Seaton, et al., ‘Fact checking and information in
the age of Covid’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 91,
no. 3, 2020, pp. 578–584; L. Graves, Deciding What’s
True: The Rise of Political Fact-Checking in American
Journalism, New York, Columbia University
Press, 2016.
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regulation of its practices was unnecessary.
Fact checking also features increasingly prom-
inently in media coverage of political speeches
and parliamentary debates. In the 2019 UK
general election campaign, for instance, ITV
News employed FullFact.org to analyse state-
ments made by Boris Johnson and Jeremy Cor-
byn in their televised leadership debate, with
the aim of better informing voters about the
validity of opposing claims. Indeed, ‘reality
check’ (a fact-checking service) now consti-
tutes an entire section of the BBC’s news
website.4
While other goals (notably preventing hate
speech and the incitement of violence) are also
central to this nascent regime of epistemic reg-
ulation, fact checking is thus firmly established
as a dominant principle for improving the
quality of political debate and deliberation.
We can distinguish many different forms and
roles of fact checking—based for instance, on
whether it is actively used to remove content,
flag content, or offer supporting contextual
analysis of the evidence used within that con-
tent.5 But all of these forms rest implicitly on
the ‘fact’/‘value’ distinction, and on a some-
what narrow account of the requirements of a
healthy public sphere. In particular, in the reg-
ulatorymodel we aremoving towards, the fac-
tual ‘truth’ content of online debate is
understood as fair game for epistemic inter-
ventions intended to promote a more
informed democratic debate.6 Crucially, how-
ever, normative reasoning (reasoning about
‘values’) is left out of this framework. Facts
are seen as objective (if complex, multifaceted)
features of ‘the world out there’, and thus can
be established and interpreted by independent
actors.7 Values, on the other hand, are
understood as a matter of personal opinion,
sentiment or ideology, and should be worked
out in the free marketplace of political ideas
without similar supporting interventions.
Here, I suggest that fact checking is a useful
but incomplete framework for delivering an
epistemically healthy public sphere. Through
a brief history of the fact/value distinction, it
is argued that there is no secure justification
for limiting interventions aimed at improving
the emergent digital public sphere only to fac-
tual claims. On this basis, the heuristic princi-
ple of ‘value checking’ is outlined as a
complement to fact checking in the epistemic
regulation of political discourse. Value check-
ing would accept that more sophisticated and
deliberative communication is a vital require-
ment for a functioning public sphere, and that
this goal can be usefully promoted through
new forms of epistemic regulation and scaf-
folding. However, it would reject the notion
that fact checking is sufficient for this, suggest-
ing that the improvement of political debate
should also extend to value-based reasoning.
The principle of value checking could be
added to the fact-checking paradigm as an
additional means of enriching political dis-
course, so that it more closely approximates
the ideal of a functioning public sphere.
Limitations of the fact-checking
paradigm
Fact checking has developed as a largely ad hoc
response to the problems of post-truth politics
and digital media. While it occupies an
increasingly central place in our political cul-
ture, it has not been underpinned by a sophis-
ticated account of the epistemic conditions for
a healthy public sphere and the proper exer-
cise of democratic citizenship. Moreover, once
we start to try and flesh out what this might
look like, we find there appear to be no secure
grounds for cordoning off the purely ‘factual’
content of political claims from their norma-
tive or ethical content, or for accepting the for-
mer as a legitimate object for epistemic
regulation and public education, but not the
latter.
4BBC News, Reality Check, various dates; https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/reality_check (accessed 21
April 2021).
5L. Graves and A. Mantarlis, ‘Amid political spin
and online misinformation, fact checking adapts’,
The Political Quarterly, vol. 91, no. 3, 2020,
pp. 585–591.
6As Full Fact describes its mission: ‘Full Fact fights
for the right information to reach the people who
need it most … As fact checkers we’ve seen first-
hand how bad information promotes hate, damages
people’s health, and hurts democracy’; https://
fullfact.org/about/ (accessed 21 April 2021).
7L. Graves, ‘Anatomy of a fact check: objective prac-
tice and the contested epistemology of fact
checking’, Communication, Culture and Critique,
vol. 10, no. 3, 2017, pp. 518–537.
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Regulating the digital public sphere
The rationale for any sort of interventions to
regulate, oversee or support the nature of
online political debate has its basis in theories
of democratic citizenship. In particular, regu-
lation to improve the nature of online debate
has often been understood through the lens
of Jürgen Habermas’s notion of the public
sphere.8 According to Habermas, while exclu-
sive and imperfect, the bourgeois public
sphere of the Enlightenment and the ideal of
rational public deliberation it was based on—
born in the salons, coffee shops and the early
print press—nevertheless contained an eman-
cipatory kernel. It pointed the way towards a
potentially radical and egalitarian basis for
political authority, after the collapse of feudal
absolutism and divine right. The goal was to
universalise, expand access to and improve
the functioning of this public sphere so that
its participatory potential could be realised
and it could approximate the standards of
rational interpersonal communication.
However, according to Habermas, the frag-
ile ideal of the public sphere opened up by
the Enlightenment had been gradually trivia-
lised and closed through the concentration,
commodification and commercialisation of
the mass media in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth century, so that the press became a source
of sensationalism, hysteria and propaganda.9
Rather than fulfilling the original promise of
the public sphere as a participatory space for
egalitarian deliberation, the media became
subsumed under the totalising systems of con-
trol of Fordist capitalism. Understood through
this lens, the radical ease of access and expres-
sion that digital platforms such as Twitter rep-
resent offers the potential to overcome some of
the limitations of the commercialised, tradi-
tional mass media that dominated late twenti-
eth century political communication. This
utopian vision underpinned optimistic early
assessments of the potential of online spaces
to improve democratic participation and
discourse.
However, this is clearly not the reality that
we see on online platforms today. In fact, the
digital sphere has fallen short of the Habers-
masian ideal of the public sphere in much the
same way as other mass media before it.10
Owing to its own creeping commercialisation
and concentration (as key platforms exploit
network effects to colonise an ever greater
share of online communication), uneven
power relations that determine access to and
control of information and data, and the
increasingly sophisticated uses of that data to
target and fragment political messaging, the
digital sphere has also been closed and priva-
tised in much the same way.11 Add to that
the constraints put upon political expression
by the format of platforms such as Twitter,
which encourage sensationalised and simpli-
fied statements, and also the broader rise of
valence politics which extols opinions and
identity over technical policy detail, and we
have the general sense of a public sphere in cri-
sis once again.
These basic arguments provide justification
for new forms of non-coercive epistemic regu-
lation and scaffolding to improve the quality
of digital debate and deliberation, and to cor-
rect for some of these tendencies in contempo-
rary political communication.12 They provide
a basis for rejecting libertarian accounts that
any such interventions represent an illegiti-
mate or undemocratic intrusion into ‘free
speech’—because the practice of democracy
is understood as having important epistemic
pre-conditions. However, they do not tell us
much about what these regulations should
do, or their proper scope.
8S. Chambers, ‘Truth, deliberative democracy, and
the virtues of accuracy: is fake news destroying the
public sphere?’, Political Studies, vol. 69, no. 1, 2021,
pp. 147–163; C. Fuchs, ‘Social media and the public
sphere’, Communication, Capitalism and Critique,
vol. 12, no. 1, 2014, pp. 57–101; T. Rasmussen, ‘The
internet and the political public sphere’, Sociology
Compass, vol. 8, no. 12, 2014, pp. 1315–29.
9J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois
Society, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989.
10M. Hindman, The Internet Trap: How the Digital
Economy Builds Monopolies and Undermines Democ-
racy, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2018.
11M. West, ‘Is the internet an emergent public
sphere?’, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, vol. 28, 2013,
pp. 155–159.
12B. Bimber and H. Gil de Zúñiga, ‘The unedited
public sphere’, New Media and Society, vol. 22,
no. 4, 2020, pp. 700–715.
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Beyond the fact/value distinction
With the rise of the fact-checking paradigm,
this gap has been (implicitly) filled through a
problematic account grounded in the fact/
value distinction, with its origins in a positivist
understanding of legitimate authoritative
knowledge. The concept of fact checking
frames the problems of post-truth politics as
reducible mainly to a lack of information
(‘facts’), leading to sub-optimally rational
decision making on the part of publics and
electorates.
The fact/value distinction can be traced
back to the philosophy of David Hume in the
eighteenth century.13 Hume famously distin-
guished propositions about what ‘is and is
not’ from propositions about ‘ought and
ought not’. G. E Moore later developed
Hume’s ideas into a critique of the ‘naturalistic
fallacy’, the belief that you cannot infer an ‘is’
from an ‘ought’.14 With this line of thinking,
we have the development of the notion that
there are two fundamentally different types
of human knowledge: 1) positive, factual
knowledge of the type obtained through
empirical scientific enquiry, observation and
experiment; and 2) normative claims about eth-
ical and moral principles or the good life.
Moreover, normative knowledge is its own
distinct form of enquiry, that bears no relation
to the facts about the physical world estab-
lished by empirical science.
Crucially, nothing in Hume or Moore sug-
gests that normative knowledge is somehow
illegitimate, or not the proper stuff of rational
political analysis or democratic deliberation.
Nor was there the idea that we cannot come
to any conclusions or judgements about nor-
mative issues, and that they are simplymatters
of personal opinion. Indeed, the analytical tra-
dition of normative enquiry Moore represents
was dedicated precisely to trying to think
through and securely ground the normative
principles that should guide social and politi-
cal life. Moore even subscribed to the idea of
moral realism, which suggested that norma-
tive and ethical propositions represent
objective features of the world, no less ‘real’
or true than empirical facts.
It was, rather, from logical positivism that
we inherit the general contempt for normative
forms of reasoning that continues to saturate
our political and intellectual life, and that
implicitly sets the limits of the contemporary
fact-checking agenda. According to the logical
positivist philosophers of the interwar years,
there is not just a clear distinction between
positive and normative knowledge. There is
also a clear hierarchy. For the logical positivists
there were only two valid ways of disproving
a statement: firstly, empirical observations of
‘the world out there’; secondly, mathematical
reasoning and sound logical inference. This
again had its origins in Hume, with his state-
ment that:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity
or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask,
Does it contain any abstract reasoning concern-
ing quantity or number? No. Does it contain
any experimental reasoning concerning matter
of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the
flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion.15
While this does not in principle exclude nor-
mative reasoning, in practice it led to the valor-
isation of mathematical and scientific enquiry,
and the general assumption that all other
forms of ethical, social and political delibera-
tion were meaningless metaphysics.
This positivist suspicion toward normative
reasoning was perhaps exemplified by the
developments within economics over
the twentieth century.16 Economists increas-
ingly argued that their discipline was a strictly
positive and value-free science, which accord-
ing to Milton Friedman was famously ‘inde-
pendent of any particular ethical position or
normative judgements’.17 It was this, more-
over, that grounded its unique authority and
13D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Under-
standing, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2008 [1748].
14G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1903.
15Hume, Enquiry, p. 120.
16D. W. Hands, ‘The positive-normative dichotomy
and economics’, in U. Maki, ed., Philosophy of Eco-
nomics, Amsterdam, North Holland, 2012,
pp. 219–239.
17M. Friedman, ‘The methodology of positive eco-
nomics’, in D. Hausmann, ed., The Philosophy of Eco-
nomics: An Anthology, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2008 [1958], p. 146.
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legitimacywithin political debate and the pub-
lic sphere.
Over the course of the twentieth century,
there have been innumerable critiques both of
the privileging of positivist forms of expertise
over normative reasoning, and also of the con-
ceptual robustness of the fact/value distinc-
tion itself.18 Turning to the first, the whole
tradition of analytical political theory since at
least John Rawls, represents a sustained
attempt to logically clarify, distinguish and
develop alternative normative principles
and to apply them to the problems of political
society. While, like any scientific discipline,
consensus or a single orthodoxy has not
emerged from these attempts, they are just as
much a part of the body of knowledge and
expertise that is relevant to considering and
appraising the different statements made by
different actors within the public sphere as
the judgements of more positive forms of
expertise.
Regarding the latter, numerous philosophi-
cal projects have called into question the very
existence of the fact/value distinction. These
include (inter alia) logicians such as William
Quine andHilary Putnam, philosophers of sci-
ence such as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend
and Norwood Hanson, and pragmatist theo-
ries of language such as the late Wittgenstein
and J. L. Austin.19 These various schools of
thought have highlighted the theory-
ladenness of all empirical observation, the
social embeddedness of truth claims and
knowledge production, and the implicit nor-
mativity contained within the structuring
assumptions of many apparent value-free
forms of enquiry (for instance, the normative
conception of rationality that underpins neo-
classical economic analysis). They have also
shifted our understanding of truth from a cor-
respondence theory (statements are true when
they correspond to the objective world out
there) to a coherence theory (statements are
true to the extent that they internally cohere
within a socially established set of norms for
validating them). All of them suggest that
any attempt to draw a clear line around ‘facts’
and to single them out as the sole site for
remedying the ills of contemporary political
discourse is precarious.
From fact checking to value
checking
If we acknowledge this, limiting the regulation
and appraisal of statements made within the
emerging digital public sphere to ‘fact check-
ing’ appears problematic. It means that, by
itself, it cannot bear the burden our society is
placing on it for improving the quality of polit-
ical discourse. We can distinguish weaker and
stronger versions of this claim. Firstly, even if
we do accept the fact/value distinction, but
reject the logical positivist dismissal of norma-
tive knowledge as pseudoscience, then there is
no basis for restricting the critical appraisal of
political statements and discourse to factual/
empirical knowledge. Secondly, if we take
seriously the philosophical criticisms of the
fact/value distinction, then improving politi-
cal discourse also requires promoting a richer
understanding of the values and assumptions
that underpin even supposedly ‘factual’ or
value-free claims and expertise.
Value checking: strong and weak
versions
Turning to the first, weaker version of this
claim, fact checking currently focusses only on
clarifying and contextualising the empirical con-
tent of political claims. For instance, in response
to a political claim about poverty or inequality
in the UK, a fact-checking organisation might
analyse the different methods for measuring
poverty/inequality and its evolution over time.
They might assess how these are used selec-
tively or cherry-picked by public figures to tell
different stories about how these have evolved,
and thereby paint an incomplete or uncontex-
ualised picture of the impact certain policies or
governments have had upon this issue. This
has been especially prominent in UK politics
over the last decade, with the controversial
change to the way in which child poverty was
measured by the coalition government under
thenWork and Pensions Secretary, IainDuncan
Smith, and the more general debate between
18P. Gorski, ‘Beyond the fact/value distinction: eth-
ical naturalism and the social sciences’, Sociology,
vol. 50, 2013, pp. 543–553.
19H. Putnam, ‘Beyond the fact/value dichotomy’, in
A. Tauber, ed., Science and the Quest for Reality,
New York, New York University Press, 1997,
pp. 363–369.
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absolute versus relative measures of income in
the measurement of poverty.
However, under their current mandate,
based around establishing only the ‘facts’, fact
checkers do not similarly act to contextualise
and clarify the distinctive normative content of
political claims. This could include, for
instance, the theories of distributive justice
that they implicitly support and objections
which could be raised against them. This risks
giving the misleading impression (to a viewer
or user) that, if they have understood whether
a political figure has got the ‘facts’ right, their
broader claim is necessarily sound and valid.
Taking the above example once again, claims
about inequality levels or poverty generally
rest on some (often unstated) principle of dis-
tributional justice. The Rawlsian difference
principle—which states that rising levels of
inequality are just and morally acceptable, so
long as the worst off are getting materially
better—might be one. This might be con-
trasted with ‘sufficientarian’ accounts, which
set a certain absoluteminimum threshold stan-
dard of living beneath which no member of a
given political society should be allowed to
fall, egalitarian accounts of distribution fair-
ness of the type developed by G. A. Cohen,
or various other prominent normative posi-
tions on distributional equity. Interpreting
these positions might be just as important to
understanding and assessing whether a politi-
cal claim is valid, or valid in what sense, as accu-
rately interpreting the empirical facts about
poverty and inequality.
Turning to the second, stronger critique of the
limitations of fact checking: by focussing only on
establishing the ‘facts’ and on their indepen-
dence and ‘objectivity’, they tend to operationa-
lise a hard fact/value distinction which, in the
process, tends to validate certain forms of exper-
tise as ‘value-free’. This risks under-playing the
political and normative assumptions embedded
in scientific and social-scientific disciplines and
theoretical traditions. As an example, main-
stream macroeconomics is generally appealed
to as the appropriate body of expertise to assess
political claims made about ‘the economy’, usu-
ally without unpacking the normatively contest-
able assumptions this tradition of thought is
founded upon. As an example, the Lucas cri-
tique that nowunderpins all mainstreammacro-
economic modelling and forecasting (often held
up as a source of value-free facts, for instance
in debates over the economic impact of Brexit
or the merits of austerity policies), has been
shown to rest upon theoretical assumptions
(an equilibrium account of the business cycle)
which assume in advance a limited role for gov-
ernment intervention.20 In other words, these
models have political and normative assump-
tions built into them a priori (they are not a ‘find-
ing’ of the model), and cannot be appealed to as
a source of factual information without this con-
text. Consequently, the sorts of political posi-
tions and claims that are bolstered by these
forms of expertise and analysis are investedwith
a falsely secure authority.
Relatedly, current fact-checking practices
tend implicitly to validate certain forms of evi-
dence over others. For instance, they repro-
duce a bias for quantitative data over
qualitative data, even though the epistemic
justifications for this preference may be shaky
when applied to many political questions or
claims. It is very rare to see fact checkers scru-
tinise claims that could be proven or disproven
only by qualitative data (for example, ‘I think
the people of this country have had enough
of experts’). This means, for one thing, that
our political discourse is not being enriched
by thewealth of qualitative research that could
enhance our understanding and appraisal of
political claims.
Fact checking also risks giving the impres-
sion that the proper standards of evidence for
establishing the validity of a claim are internal
to the claim itself. As such, if audiences only
consult fact checkers in seeking to inform their
political opinions and choices, they will have
little basis on which to better understand or
contest the background assumptions and
‘problem frames’ that political rhetoric mobi-
lises. Consider a fact check of a BBC phone-in
during the 2019 general election campaign,
during which Boris Johnson responded to
viewers’ questions on the Conservative gov-
ernment’s record and policy stances.21 It
included an analysis of childcare policy. But,
20Known as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models; K. A. Moos, ‘The facts and the
values of the Lucas critique’, Review of Political
Economy, vol. 31, no. 1, 2019, pp. 1–25.
21BBC News, ‘General election 2019: Boris
Johnson BBC phone-in claims fact-checked’,
15 November 2019; https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/50433294 (accessed 21 April 2021).
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in keeping with the general principles of fact
checking, it limited itself narrowly to unpack-
ing some further details about the govern-
ment’s scheme to subsidise paid childcare
and its coverage. Thus, it did not interrogate
the background assumptions that frame this
way of analysing the problem: for instance,
that childcare must be provided as a commod-
ity, and that it cannot be addressed through
more fundamental labour market reforms
such as job sharing, working time regulations,
or basic income provision. This is perfectly in
keeping with fact checkers’ current interpreta-
tion of their mandate and their hesitancy to
conduct any analysis which seen as ‘biased’
or ‘value laden’. But, as an aid to a voter trying
to understand the full range of issues that are
at stake in social policy on childcare and social
reproduction, and the full range of possible
viable positions that can be taken on these
issues, it is of limited use.
Value checking as a supplement to fact
checking
How might we extend and supplement the
fact-checking paradigm so that it can address
some of these limitations? One way would be
to add another form of epistemic regulation
for the new public sphere, which wemight call
value checking. Value checking could run
alongside political news coverage and social
media content, just as fact checking does
already. However, it would have a distinctive
mandate and function that would focus on
correcting the three problems identified above.
First, it could seek to improve public under-
standing of the normative content underpin-
ning political adverts and claims that we are
exposed to on a daily basis (as well as simply
their factual validity). This could include brief
and easy-to-understand summaries of the
(explicit or implicit) normative positions that
politicians’ rhetoric draws upon and mobi-
lises. It could also include assessment of how
coherent these are with existing positions in
the literature and contrast them with viable
alternative perspectives found in normative
theory. Second, it could seek to identify the
assumptions that different bodies or expertise
are founded on, and the potential political
and normative baggage of these—providing
users, for instance, with links to alternative
research founded on different epistemological
commitments and starting premises. It would
also seek to identify clearly these assumptions
andpremises so as tomake themmore transpar-
ent. Third, it could provide supporting analysis
that brieflyunpacks the assumptions embedded
in certain ways of framing a problem, helping
citizens to grasp how the universe of viable
‘solutions’ to a political issue is often con-
strained by the way in which that problem is
framed, and the alternative problem frames that
exist on the issue under discussion.
This sort of a mandate and mission would
be quite different from the current framing of
fact checkers, but it could provide an impor-
tant supplement to the principles and practices
they have pioneered. In other words, value
checking would provide an additional broad
principle that could sit alongside fact checking,
aiding its mission to improve the epistemic
functioning of the public sphere. Along with
fact checking, it accepts that supporting episte-
mic scaffolding of public debate and discourse
can assist in the task of building better forms of
deliberation andmore ‘rational’ (in the Haber-
masian sense) public discourse and communi-
cation. But, reflecting dominant trends in
philosophy and epistemology over the past
century, it would reject the fact/value distinc-
tion on which the fact-checking paradigm has
been constructed and the problematic baggage
that accompanies it.
Summary
Faulty ethical or normative reasoning dam-
ages the quality of democratic debate just as
much as faulty information or ‘facts’. More-
over, currently dominant schools of thought
in philosophy and epistemology generally
reject the notion of a clear distinction between
the two. There is, therefore, no prima facie rea-
son for justifying interventions into public dis-
course that improve the latter, while taking no
action to improve the former. Consequently,
while the rise of fact checking has been an
important step in the right direction towards
a richer democratic discourse, it seems impera-
tive to supplement fact checking with value
checking. This form of epistemic scaffolding
would explicitly acknowledge normative rea-
soning as equally essential as empirical facts
to the ability to scrutinise fully, understand
and respond to political discourse—and thus
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to the attainment of a flourishing public
sphere. Value checking would still be ‘neu-
tral’, in the sense of performing this function
equally rigorously for politicians from all sides
of the political spectrum. However, it could
abandon the pretence of value-free knowledge
and the hard fact/value distinction, explicitly
seeking to helping voters and publics better
understand and scrutinise the normative con-
tent of political discourse. As such, value
checking could provide an important supple-
ment to fact checking as an epistemic support
for contemporary democracy.
David Yarrow is Lecturer in Political Economy
at the University of Edinburgh.
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